Did the Great Recession change the regional reputation premium for wine in the US?  by Gokcekus, Omer & Finnegan, Clare M.
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com2212-9774 & 20
http://dx.doi.org/
nCorrespondin
E-mail addre
Peer review u
1The price qu
(the divisor). Fo
have a price quaWine Economics and Policy 2 (2013) 27–32
www.elsevier.com/locate/wepDid the Great Recession change the regional reputation premium for wine in
the US?
Omer Gokcekusn, Clare M. Finnegan
Seton Hall University, 400 S. Orange Avenue, South Orange, NJ 07079, USA
Available online 10 June 2013Abstract
Wine is an experience good and also (at least under certain circumstances and to a certain extent) a conspicuous consumption good. As such,
wine buyers should be willing to pay a premium for regional reputation to avoid risk and to send signals about their wealth and social status.
At the same time, wine is an annually produced good; every year new bottles arrive to wine stores. Accordingly, a wine store's manager has to
periodically clear the store's inventory. Statistical analyses indicate that, during the Great Recession in the US, two developments—a substantial
decline in income and a rise in information sharing via the internet and social media—had a dampening effect on the regional reputation premium
and lowered the price-quality ratio differences among different wine regions. Moreover, during the same time period, the discount rates necessary
to clear inventories signiﬁcantly increased.
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The purpose of this research study is to examine the relation-
ship between regional reputation and the price–quality ratio of
wine.1 Speciﬁcally, we empirically determine whether the
heightened interplay among ﬁve forces signiﬁcantly altered
the relationship between a wine's price–quality ratio and
regional reputation in the US during the Great Recession
(September 2008 until June 2009). Three of these forces—the
role of wine as an experience good, as a conspicuous good,
and as an annually produced good—stem from the nature of
wine and have been included in several discussions on the
hedonic price function of wine (Benfratello et al., 2009;13 UniCeSV, University of Florence. Production and hosting by E
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ality ratio is the quotient of price (the dividend) and quality
r instance, a bottle of wine rated 90 and costing $45 would
lity ratio of 0.5.Oczkowski, 1994; Schamel and Anderson, 2003). The other
two forces, namely the simultaneous decline in income and the
phenomenal increase in internet and social media use in
information sharing, developed during the Great Recession.
After brieﬂy presenting the literature survey on these ﬁve
forces, we state our theoretical proposition and the corresponding
two working hypotheses; introduce the sample utilized in the
study; present and discuss the results; and provide concluding
remarks.
2. Review of the literature
Wine is an experience good whose quality is not directly
observable ex ante. You have to buy and uncork a bottle of
wine to ﬁnd out how good it is. The average wine buyer faces
the (somewhat daunting) task of choosing a bottle of wine
based on a set of intrinsic and extrinsic cues (for details, see
Atkin and Thach, 2012, p. 54–56). Such cues include the
wine's price or its expert rating (Lockshin and Rhodus, 1993;
Schamel, 2000; Hall et al., 2004). In addition, consumers rely
on the overall reputation of a wine's origin—the region it
comes from—to indicate the wine's quality (Stuart and Smith
1997, 1998; Duhan et al., 1999; Perrouty et al., 2006, Atkinlsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
2As of February 21st, 2013, there were 254,000 users who owned 39.5
million bottles; Cellartracker's database contained 1.4 million different wines
with 3.6 million free wine reviews from real users, and more than 400,000
professional reviews from 23 publications. Cellartracker even started publish-
ing its own rating, which is the average of the community members tasting
scores coupled with Cellartracker's moniker.
3As the harvests for both 2007 and 2011 were neither atypically good nor
bad, we do not believe the harvest size to be a signiﬁcant factor in price setting
(Gevirtz, 2011; Wine Spectator, 2007).
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Simões, 2009). Accordingly, we can assume that, in setting initial
suggested retail prices, sellers attach an additional premium to
regional reputation on top of the premium allocated to expert
ratings (Lecocq and Visser, 2006; Schamel, 2006; Bruwer and
Johnson, 2010; Panzone and Simões, 2009).
A non-necessity, a wine's value is observed upon consump-
tion, making wine an experience good. Moreover, wine can be
seen as a conspicuous good. Thorstein Veblen (1899) coined
the term conspicuous consumption. He argued that sometimes
consumers purchase a good not just for its intrinsic value, but
for its signaling value—the good's ability to indicate wealth or
ability. Bagwell and Bernheim (1996) explain under which
circumstances “Veblen effects” arise from the desire to achieve
social status by signaling wealth through conspicuous con-
sumption; and Leibenstein (1950) and Corneo and Jeanne
(1997) show how signaling value depends on whether con-
sumer behavior is characterized by snobbism or conformism.
In regards to the signaling value of wine, Ballestrini and
Gamble (2006) ﬁnd that for Chinese consumers country of
origin information is signiﬁcantly more important than price or
brand, especially when the purchased wine is for a special
occasion and will be exposed to others' judgment. Terrien and
Steichen (2008) also explore the social dimension of wine and
ﬁnd that snobbism (opposition) combined with conformism
(imitation) may explain variation in wine demand. Thus, it is
not farfetched to argue that some wine consumers purchase
wine not just for its intrinsic value, but for its signaling
value. Particularly in times of economic prosperity, the motive
for conspicuous consumption purchases may cause wines
coming from “reputable regions” to incur a signiﬁcant pre-
mium. By the same token, during times of economic downturn
the conspicuous consumption motive may place dampening
pressure on this regional premium. In fact, according to
Catherine Rampell, reporter for the New York Times, the Great
Recession did cause consumers to move downmarket and
purchase wines from less expensive regions (Rampell, 2008).
During the Great Recession, income levels were down and
unemployment was on the rise. Concurrently with the reces-
sion, there was an explosion in the use of the internet via
various mobile devices, which signiﬁcantly expedited informa-
tion sharing. Wine had its fair share of increased exposure
from this explosion; incidentally, wine is the most frequently
searched beverage online (Storchmann, 2012, p. 3). In addition
to seeking experts' opinions, consumers pay attention to “similar
other” opinions. Social psychologists have extensively documen-
ted how and why people are inﬂuenced by actions and beliefs of
similar others (Sherif, 1936; Asch, 1956; Cialdini et al., 1990;
Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004). Consumers even accept informa-
tion obtained from similar others as evidence about reality
(Deutsch and Gerard, 1955: p. 629). As Griskevicius et al.
(2008) (p. 84) explained, because of the wide reach and easy
access recently provided by the internet, consumers have even
started “… abandoning traditional expert sources in favor of the
perspectives of their peers” over a wide range of issues.
Raghuram et al. (2009) examine how friends inﬂuence the
purchases of users in a social network; Chevalier and Mayzlin(2006) analyze the effect of “word-of-mouth” on book sales by
looking at customer reviews at amazon.com and bn.com.
However, social networking effects have not been limited to
online book retailers. Established in 2003, Cellartracker.com is
the world's largest wine social networking site, in both number
of cataloged bottles and number of listed tasting notes.2 Thus,
it is defendable to argue that in the last few years, the internet
and social media outlets have ampliﬁed the relevance of
consumer ratings of a bottle of wine and word-of-mouth
effects because of their low cost and easy access (Dellarocas,
2003: p. 1410).
Wine is an annually produced agricultural good. Johnson
and Robinson (2007) (p. 42) write that “the great majority of
wine made today, however, is ready to drink within a year or
less of being bottled, and some wines are best drunk straight
off the bottling line.” Simply put, the bulk of wine produced
has to be consumed in a short period of time, usually within a
few years. Retailers are eager to clear a signiﬁcant share of
their inventory in a year before wines from the next vintage
arrive. Both a wine store's inventory composition in terms of
vintage and its regular sale events reﬂect these two facts. These
characteristics of wine should magnify the impact of changes
in income and ﬂow of information about the quality of a bottle
of wine on wine sales, and consequently determine which
wines sell fast and which wines sit on shelves until deeply
discounted.33. A model and hypotheses
To sum up, based on the explanations provided in the
previous section, and given the three characteristics of wine—
experiential, perishable, and conspicuous—due to decreased
income and the faster ﬂow of information on wine quality
during the Great Recession, we expect to see a signiﬁcant
change in the relationship between wine price, quality, and
regional reputation in the US. Speciﬁcally, we set the follow-
ing two workable hypotheses: during the Great Recession (1)
the discount rate necessary to clear inventory increased; and
(2) the regional reputation premium—the additional money
paid to acquire a similarly rated (the same quality) bottle from
a more reputable region—declined. To test the validity of the
ﬁrst argument descriptive statistics are calculated; to test the
second argument, ﬁrst the following regression equation is
estimated and then appropriate statistical tests are conducted:
ðPrice=qualityÞit ¼ α0 þ α1ðRegional reputationÞit þ εit ð1Þ
In this equation, Price is the suggested retail price of a bottle
of wine (using the US Consumer Price index, CPI, all prices
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Quality is an expert's rating (e.g., Wine Spectator or Wine
Advocate) of a bottle wine (on a 100 points scale).4 Regional
Reputation is an index calculated based on a survey—sent to
the 12 members of the Editorial Advisory Board of the Journal
of Wine Economics—in which experts were asked to grade the
reputation of a number of wine regions (on a scale from 1 to 10;
and the higher the better). To our knowledge, this is the only such
survey in existence (for further details on the index's construction,
see Gokcekus and Nottebaum, 2012). Subscript i is for the ith bottle
of wine and t is for the year t. Finally, εit is an independent and
identically distributed error term.4. Sample
In the US, the Great Recession started in September 2008.
Therefore to test the two hypotheses, we use two sets of wine
data, one before the recession and one after the end of the
recession. For both sets the information is from the same wine
store, the Wine Library. Located in Springﬁeld, New Jersey,
the Wine Library is one of the largest wine stores on the East
Coast in the US and has an excellent web presence. The
sample consisted of 405 wines from 16 different wine regions
—Bordeaux (20 wines), Burgundy (49 wines), Rhone (34
wines), Loire (20 wines), Italy (51 wines), Portugal (16 wines),
Spain (20 wines), Napa (30 wines), Sonoma (26 wines),
other California (30 wines), Washington (25 wines), Australia
(21 wines), New Zealand (8 wines), Argentina (24 wines),
Chile (15 wines), and South Africa (16 wines). Information on
221 of these wines was collected during the spring sale in
March 2008 from the Wine Library's web page; and the
remaining 184 wines were collected from the summer sale in
June 2012.
It should be noted that only wines with professional ratings
between 85 and 95 are included in the sample sets.5 Furthermore,
we excluded (1) wines on sale with no regional reputation index,
e.g., wines from Austria, Israel, Oregon; and (2) port or sparkling
wines. Consequently, only 405 out of the 710 wines in the two
sales, i.e., 57% are included. Table 1 provides summary statistics
regarding expert ratings of each bottle, suggested retail price,
actual retail price, discount rate6, regional reputation, and price–
quality ratio in 2008 and in 2012.4Admittedly, there are differences in the way experts rate wines. However,
the average consumer is unlikely to be aware of these differences or biases
between the various scoring systems, and only focus on the actual rating of the
bottle. Indeed, this “point bias” has been identiﬁed as one of the most common
“mistakes” made by wine consumers (Kramer, 2013).
5In order to prevent outlier bias, we removed all ratings from our sample sets
that were more than 2 standard deviations below or above the mean of our
sample (for information on the mean, see Table 1). Thus, our sample is
comprised only of wines rated between 85 and 95 points.
6The summary statistics for the mean discount rates in Table 1 have been
calculated based on the raw (ungrouped) data collected on suggested list price
and sale price for Spring 2008 and Summer 2012 and not on the percent
change between the average suggested list price and average sale price. For
instance, the listed mean discount rate of 22.67% in Spring 2008 is calculated
from Σdiscount rate/n, not from 70.61 (the average suggested list price) and
54.44 (the average sale price).5. Results
Regarding the ﬁrst hypothesis, as Table 1 shows, the average
discount rate in 2008 was 22.67% and it was 33.61% in 2012.
Based on the t-test result, the 10.95 percentage points difference
was statistically signiﬁcant (t¼−12.69, po0.01). At the same
time, average retail prices, both suggested and actual, were lower
in 2012 compared to those in 2008. Moreover, while the
difference between the average suggested retail price and the
actual retail price was $1.60 in 2008, it was $11.55 in 2012.
These observations most likely indicate recognition of the
declining purchasing power of American wine buyers by wine
suppliers and retailers.
To test the second hypothesis, we follow a three step
procedure. First, the magnitude of the relationship between
regional reputation and the price–quality ratio is estimated.
Second, whether this relationship is stable or not is examined.
Third, the estimated coefﬁcients for regional reputation—the
regional reputation premium—from before and after the Great
Recession are compared.
There is no a priori particular functional form to better
depict the relationship between the price–quality ratio and
regional reputation. Therefore, instead of imposing a particular
functional form on this relationship, as is reported in Table 2,
we estimate the model in Eq. (1) with four possible functional
forms—linear, two semi-logarithmic, and logarithmic. Our ﬁndings
indicate the following. First, regardless of the functional form
chosen the regression results indicate a statistically signiﬁcant
positive relationship between the price–quality ratio and regional
reputation. Both in 2008 and in 2012, there was a regional
reputation premium—i.e., the more reputable a region a bottle
of wine belongs to, the higher its price–quality ratio.
Second, again regardless of the functional form chosen, this
premium was higher in 2008 than in 2012. Table 3 contains the
F-statistics (Chow, 1960) utilized to determine whether there
was a structural change in the relationship between the price–
quality ratio and regional reputation from 2008 to 2012. The
table also presents Welch's t-statistics (Welch, 1947) to check
whether the regional reputation premium, i.e., the coefﬁcient
for Regional Reputation variable, varied before and after the
Great Recession.
To summarize, based on these reported statistics, there was a
statistically signiﬁcant positive relationship between the price–
quality ratio and regional reputation; this relationship was
different in 2008 and in 2012; speciﬁcally, the relationship was
stronger in 2008 than in 2012.
The following is an exercise to further demonstrate the change
in the regional reputation premium from 2008 to 2012. Based on
the R2 and F-statistics criteria, regression results for the semi-
logarithmic version (log of (P/Q) as dependent and Regional
Reputation as the independent variable) look better. Accordingly,
we use the estimation results in Column (3) for spring 2008 and
in Column (7) for summer 2012, to further demonstrate the
change in the regional reputation premium. Fig. 1 tells the story.
In 2008, the average price–quality ratio for wines from
Argentina (with a regional reputation index of 4.17) was 0.28;
Chile (with a regional reputation index of 5.00) was 0.34; and
Table 1
Summary statistics and t-test results.
Spring 2008 (n¼221) Summer 2012 (n¼184) Difference (S. 2012–S. 2008) t-Statistic a (Equal variances not assumed)
Mean Mean
Expert rating (Q) 92.22 90.99 −1.22 6.20
Suggested list price (P) $70.61 $54.84 −$15.77 2.86
Retail price $69.02 $43.29 −$25.72 4.84
Sale price $54.44 $35.82 −$18.62 4.50
Discount rate %22.67 %33.61 %10.95 −12.69
P/Q ratio 0.76 0.56 −0.20 3.49
aThe differences are statistically signiﬁcant at po0.01 (two-tailed).
Table 2
OLS regression results: price/quality¼ f(Regional Reputation).
Spring 2008 Summer 2012
P/Q ln(P/Q) P/Q ln(P/Q) P/Q ln(P/Q) P/Q ln(P/Q)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Regional Reputation (RR) 0.253b (0.03)a 0.268b (0.03) 0.095b (0.02) 0.195b (0.03)
ln(RR) 1.528b (0.20) 1.664b (0.18) 0.622b (0.10) 1.305b (0.35)
N 221 221 221 221 184 184 184 184
R2 0.25 0.31 0.21 0.28 0.18 0.24 0.17 0.23
RSS 98.36 82.52 103.59 86.68 18.58 56.00 18.85 56.30
F-statistic 74.01 99.27 59.24 84.00 40.21 55.87 37.09 54.60
aStandard errors are in parentheses.
bStatistical signiﬁcance at po0.01 (two-tailed).
Table 3
Is there a structural change between 2008 and 2012? F-test results Is the regional reputation premium different between 2008 and 2012? Welch’s t-test results.
Functional form Structural difference? Premium difference?
RSSa pooled F-value difference Welch’s t-statistic
Linear: Column (2) versus (6) 130.89 24.16b 0.158 5.80b
Semi-log I: Column (3) versus (7) 148.88 15.14b 0.073 3.85b
Semi-log II: Column (4) versus (8) 134.40 19.78b 0.906 13.84b
Logarithmic: Column (5) versus (9) 152.29 13.19b 0.359 8.19b
aRSS¼ residual sum of squares; and F-critical value (2,120) upper 1% points¼4.79.
bStatistical signiﬁcance at po0.01 (two-tailed).
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the other hand, for regions with a relatively high reputation
index the average price–quality ratios were much higher: e.g.,
for Rhone (with a regional reputation index of 7.50) it was
0.67; for Napa (with a regional reputation index of 8.71) 0.93;
Burgundy (with a regional reputation index of 9.33) 1.10; and
ﬁnally for Bordeaux (with the highest regional reputation
index of 9.42) the price–quality ratio was 1.13.
According to these price–quality ratios, in 2008, a bottle of
wine with an expert rating of 90 points was either priced at
$25, $61, $84, or $101 if it was from Argentina, Rhone, Napa,and Bordeaux, respectively. The wine buyers of a 90 points
rated Bordeaux wine were paying $76 more as compared to a
90 points rated wine from Argentina.
In 2012, as Fig. 1 shows, the wine buyers were still paying a
hefty regional reputation premium, yet it was much lower than
the one paid in 2008. For “the same 90 points wine” the prices
were $23, $43, $55, or $63 if it was from Argentina, Rhone,
Napa, and Bordeaux, respectively. Compared to a 90 points
rated wine from Argentina, in 2012 wine buyers were paying
$40 more for a wine from Bordeaux. In other words the regional
reputation premium had signiﬁcantly shrunk.
Fig. 1. Regional Reputation Premium for different wine regions: before and
after the Great Recession in the US.
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The main motivation for this study was to assess the potential
impact of the Great Recession on the prices wine buyers are
willing to pay and, perhaps more importantly, its impact on the
regional reputation premium buyers are paying. As the ﬁndings
suggest, there is a signiﬁcant change in the regional reputation
premium wine buyers are willing to pay; this should be taken
into account when setting prices and when determining the
appropriate marketing and advertising strategies.
Despite the decline, in 2012 the regional reputation premium
still existed and was signiﬁcant. As such, the question is
whether the decline is temporary or not. If it reﬂects the decline in
income, it is reasonable to expect that the regional reputation
premium could return to where it was before the Great Recession,
once the economy recovers and starts growing again. In other
words, once wine buyers make the switch from the bad times
mind-set to a good times mind-set, we may end up observing
higher regional reputation premium payments propelled by the
conspicuous consumption and risk reduction motives.
However, if the decline in the premium is driven by
increased information sharing about the quality of each bottle
of wine via the internet and social media, then this reduction
could be permanent. Moreover, given the constant growth of
these two outlets, the premium could even decline so sub-
stantially that it would approach zero. Effectively, this would
mean that regional reputation would become irrelevant, and
wine experts' (or other wine drinkers' opinions) would be the
only relevant information regarding the quality of a bottle of
wine. In all likelihood, this scenario is rather improbable as
there will remain wine buyers who are risk averse and/or
interested in impressing others with their wealth and their
abilities by purchasing wines from more reputable regions.
Whether the decline is permanent or not, wine makers,
suppliers, and retailers may wish to re-consider their pricing,
marketing, and advertisement strategies. For instance, wineries
from less reputable regions may decide to place greater
emphasize on the bottle quality of their wines; to do so theymay wish to utilize nontraditional marketing tools available
through the internet and social media outlets in order to spread
the word about their wines.
7. Concluding remarks
Statistical analyses indicate that, during the Great Recession
in the US, a substantial decline in income and a rise in
information sharing via the internet and social media outlets
created a dampening effect on regional reputation and lowered
the price–quality ratio differences among different wine
regions. Moreover, during the same time period, the discount
rates necessary to clear inventories signiﬁcantly increased.
In conducting the analyses we use a particular regional
reputation index. This index was constructed based on the
Journal of Wine Economics editorial board members' opinions
in 2008; our use of this particular index raises some questions
regarding the reliability of the ﬁndings. How well do these
board members' opinions reﬂect the average wine buyer's
opinion regarding different wine growing regions? Even if
they reﬂect it very well, what if opinions about different wine
regions' reputations have changed? Another issue about the
reliability and robustness of the ﬁndings stems from the fact
that the sample includes observations from two particular sale
events; one in early 2008, just before the beginning of the
Great Recession, and the other one in summer of 2012. Moreover,
the sample used in this study included wines from two sales events
at a particular wine store; whether the pricing strategy, inventory
management, and variety composition of this store is representative
or not needs to be checked.
All in all, it is important to check the robustness of the
ﬁndings by utilizing different regional reputation indices, and
samples from different locations and times. Determining the
robustness of the relationship—established in this explanatory
study—between regional reputation and price–quality ratio will
be worthwhile effort: knowing whether this relationship is
stable or not within time may signiﬁcantly alter the way wine
industry sets prices and designs its marketing and advertising
programs.
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